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Abstract: Decentralization of generation and increasing utilization of information communication systems bring challenges to
present power system modeling approaches. This work applies functional modeling for monitoring and modeling of distributed
energy resources, with wind turbine generator (WTG) application as a case study.
First, we established a functional model of a generic WTG through the multilevel flow modeling approach. The model acts as
basis of a state estimator (SE) for monitoring the WTG. Afterwards, the application of the SE is extended for wind power plant
monitoring and control. The case study results show that the SE can efficiently limit the impact of information errors from different
data integrity attacks during active power curtailment.
1 Introduction
The decentralization of generation, through distributed energy
resources (DERs), and higher utilization of information and com-
munication technology (ICT) infrastructure, drive the power system
towards a cyber-physical system (CPS) [1]. DERs are vastly diverse
in terms of application, technology, manufacturer and specifica-
tions, making it prohibitive to study their dynamic behavior and
consequently analyze their impact on the grid operation [2].
The diversity and quantity of DERs interacting with the electric
power grid, challenges current modeling approaches within power
system engineering. Formulating and validating detailed models
of numerous DERs is time consuming and requires considerable
ICT resources, making it infeasible [2]. The approach of aggregat-
ing DERs into groups affect the accurate monitoring of individual
DERs, which is necessary when considering the intermittent nature
of renewable energy sources.
Therefore, new modeling methods are needed to better mon-
itor the diverse and distributed assets within the power system.
So far in the literature three different modeling approaches have
been proposed and investigated; empirical, physical and functional.
These approaches are compared in [3], and from a DER perspective,
each have advantages and disadvantages. The empirical approach is
based on pattern recongnition from previous observations, and is
sometimes referred to as a blackbox approach, which requires less
knowledge about the system. An example of this approach is the use
of artificial neural networks in different power system application
[4]. However, its efficiency depends strongly on the set of training
data and restricts to the specific parameters of the system and its
operational conditions [5]. Therefore, the blackbox approach may
fail to accurately identify and reason the performance of the system,
and possibly react arbitrarily to unrecognised patterns [6].
Physical modeling is based on first priciples, i.e. differential equa-
tions. The approach is used in different power system modeling
applications such as small-signal or transient stability analysis [7],
and can be highly detailed and even compensate for unobserved
quantities. However, the low abstraction level entails high com-
putational requirements and parametrization challenges at different
operation situations, which decrease the model’s generality.
Functional modeling is based on an analysis of physical phe-
nomenons and cause-effect relations within the system. So far, func-
tional modeling has experienced limited application within power
system modeling, as its main application has been within process
control and fault diagnosis [8, 9]. In the work performed by [10],
the functional modeling approach is used to explain how functions
within power system frequency control are related in the complex
control system, which helps in evaluation and integration of new
technologies. The functional modeling approach is shown to be able
to represent implicit control knowledge that could be missed by
the limited reasoning offered by empirical modeling and the low
abstraction level of physical modeling.
This paper proposes the application of functional modeling by
high level abstraction as a solution to model the operation of DERs.
The approach offers a qualitative interpretation of the physical pro-
cesses, while simultaneously maintaining an overview of the system.
This allows generalization within different DER technologies.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose and demonstrate
the ability of the functional modeling approach for DER modeling
and monitoring through the example of a wind turbine generator
(WTG). Based on the WTG model, developed via the functional
modelling approach, a state estimator (SE) is proposed for WTG
monitoring. State estimation is a basic tool in the energy manage-
ment system of grid operators, where the objective is to minimize
the impact of measurement error and false data in further analy-
sis through exploitation of measurement redundancies and physical
relations [11].
State estimators are traditionally only used by grid operators,
but in CPS, the decentralized operation and control, and the cyber
related risks, argues for the necessity of validating measurements
and data from DERs. Cyber related risks are investigated in differ-
ent current publications [12–16], especially with a focus on the risks
and effects of data integrity attacks [14–16]. Furthermore extensive
effort has already been made in proposing state estimators to handle
false data injection attacks on the overall system operator [17–
21]. In current literature however, mitigation of false data injection
attacks has mainly considered the entire transmission system, not
attacks within wind power plants (WPPs) or other DER technolo-
gies. In [13, 15] the authors have analysed the possible impact of
credible cyber-attack on wind farm supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems from a theoretical perspective without
proposing possible mitigation mechanisms.
Previous research efforts within DER monitoring through state
estimation includes [22], where a WTG SE is based on differ-
ential equations and tested with a focus on packet loss handling.
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In [23], an extended Kalman filter based SE is utilized for a per-
manent magnet synchronous generator wind turbine, and tested in
measurement noise scenarios. The work in [24] considers a dou-
bly fed induction generator (DFIG) and Kalman filters to establish a
SE connecting the collector system of the wind farm and the WTGs
within. All these methods require detailed and accurate information
of model specific parameters to give accurate results, which is dif-
ficult to obtain and differentiate for each manufacturer and model.
Furthermore, a data-driven approach for detecting anomalies in pho-
tovoltaic plants is proposed in [25] through the formulation of an
artificial neural network. A similar approach through artificial neural
networks is proposed in [26] intended for WPP and WTG applica-
tions. These data-driven methods are highly dependent on the quality
of the training set of data and does not require prior knowledge of
the actual system. Similarly, with highly dynamic systems, such as
WTGs, there is a risk of over-training the data-driven approach to
omit inclusion of fine details.
In this work, we applied the functional modeling approach to
model the energy conversion process of a WTG. The model acts
as the foundation to formulate a SE for WTG monitoring. The
SE is tested through simulating a WPP, during active power cur-
tailment under normal steady state operation, and evaluated based
on the control actions in different data integrity attack scenarios.
Results show the SE helps protecting the control system against
gross measurement errors and data integrity attacks during active
power control.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the overall principle of functional modeling and introduce the mul-
tilevel flow modeling (MFM) methodology used in this work. The
functional modeling approach is applied to the WTG energy con-
version process in Section 3, which describe the different steps from
formulating the functional model in MFM, extracting key process
equations and establishing the SE. The purpose and approach of
testing the SE in a WPP scenario is presented in Section 4, while
the results of performing different data error and integrity attacks
in a simulation environment are analysed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Functional modeling principle
The concept of functional modeling originates from software devel-
opment, with the purpose of generalizing a software application to
enable implementation in different languages. The functional mod-
els of software development describes the desired functions of the
application and explains what happens to objects within the software
application, and can be understood as a representation of pseudo-
code using flow charts and other graphical tools [27]. Later, the
functional modeling approach is applied to fault diagnosis where it
has been used to capture the key steps of a process. Examples include
a simple water mill in [28] and a nuclear power plant in [3, 8].
In order to establish a functional model of a process, knowledge
about the entire process is required, which includes, but is not lim-
ited to, the functions of the process and subprocesses, performance
standards, the relations among subprocesses, etc. The model is built
on a high level abstraction of an object that helps process opera-
tors in handling the complex dynamics and relations without loss of
details [28].
Representing a process through functional modeling is done
through a method called functional decomposition. As the name sug-
gests, the principle is to consider the overall process and iteratively
decompose its function into sub-functions [27]. In [29], the func-
tional decomposition process is demonstrated for a power system.
When decomposing the functions of a process, relations between the
different functions are revealed. There are different methods for rep-
resenting the relations and functions of a process, the methodology
used in this paper is MFM, which relates the goals, functions and
relations of a system [28].
The MFM methodology forms a visual representation of the
dependencies between the different functions of a process through
utilizing different graphical components shown in Fig. 1b. What
characterizes the MFM methodology is how it separates the func-
tions of a physical system in terms of mass or energy handling
functions, and enables a meaningful way of representing advanced
control processes. The functions handing mass are collected in mass
flow structures (MFS) and can represent a physical transportation,
separation, storage, etc. within the process. Similarly, the energy
flow structures (EFS) contain functions that transports, transforms,
converts, etc. energy. The separation helps improve the reasoning of
the process functions and relations.
In fault diagnosis, MFM is used to monitor an industrial process
by representing each function by a signal value and evaluate its oper-
ation according to predefined limits. If a process is equipped with
control capabilities, through one or more actuators, a violation of an
operational limit can be handled. In MFM, controls are represented
in control flow structures (CFS), which evaluate the status on a func-
tion and can perform an actuation on a function to change the process
operation.
What follows, is a demonstration of how functional modeling can
be a useful tool for CPS analysis. This is done through formulating
the functional model of a generic WTG through the MFM method-
ology, and using the high abstraction level of the model to derive a
set of generic equations representing the key steps within the WTG
energy conversion process. Based on the equations, a SE is formu-
lated with the objective to improve the data integrity of the WTG
monitoring, and verified by application to WPP control scenarios
using simulations.
3 WTG functional modeling application
The WTG model considered in this work is based on the generic
model of a DFIG wind turbine described in [30]. The generic
model, developed by the Western Electricity Coordinating Council
(WECC), is defined with the purpose of providing an accurate, yet
simplified, representation of actual systems at a time frame suitable
for stability simulations [31].
An overview of the WTG energy conversion process is shown
in Fig. 1a, where each of the conversion steps are separated to
improve readability. One of the central functions within the WTG, is
the balancing between the electric power output and the mechanical
power input. This behavior is indicated in Fig. 1a by the approxi-
mate equation to represent its interaction with the entire conversion
process.
In the first step of Fig. 1a, the wind intercepted by the turbine
blades, is characterized by its speed, v measured in meters per sec-
ond. In MFM, the flow of wind is modelled as the mass flow shown
in the MFS in Fig. 1c. The upstream and downstream wind is mod-
elled as a source, So1 and a sink, Si1, respectively. The wind is
transported towards and away from the turbine blades through the
transport functions Tra1 and Tra2, respectively.
As the wind hits the blades in the second step of the process
in Fig. 1a, the mass can be considered stored momentarily at the
interception. Therefore, the blades are characterized in the MFM
model through the storage function, Sto1 in Fig. 1c.
Here, a means-end relation models how the stored wind at the
blades can be interpreted as a source of kinetic energy, So2, as shown
in the EFS. The kinetic energy is transformed into rotational and
elastic energy through the connection between the turbine hub and
the shaft as indicated by the third step in Fig. 1a. In the MFMmodel,
the energy conversion to rotational and elastic energy is represented
by Tra3 and Tra4, respectively. Afterwards the rotational energy is
stored in the rotational mass, Sto2 and the elastic energy is stored in
the twisted shaft, Sto3.
In Fig. 1a, the rotational energy is represented by the rotational
speed, ωr measured in radians per second, while the elastic energy
is included in the balancing between mechanical power, Pmech, and
electrical power, Pelec both with the unit of kW. The rotational and
elastic energy is transported towards the induction generator through
Tra5 and Tra6, respectively, followed by the conversion into electric
energy modelled by Con1 in Fig. 1c, and described by the active and
reactive power P and Q, measured in kW and kvar, respectively, in
the fourth step in Fig. 1a.
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(a) Overview of wind turbine generator energy conversion process
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(b) Multilevel flow modeling concepts and symbols [28]
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(c) Functional model of conversion process through multi-
level flow modeling
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(d) Functional model of conversion process through multilevel flow
modeling with highlight of high wind speed reaction, marked in red
Fig. 1: Doubly fed induction generator representation
The electric energy is transported towards the grid connected ter-
minals, represented by the sink Si2, through the transport function
Tra7. In Fig. 1a, the grid connection is indicated by the fifth step of
the conversion process. The two converters, stator and grid side, of
the DFIG have different responsibilities in operating the WTG. The
stator side converter is responsible for controlling the current from
the WTG to the grid, and the grid side converter controls the volt-
age to a certain degree. These control responsibilities are indicated
in Fig. 1a by U and I. It is important to mention that the represen-
tation does not describe where the current and voltage is measured,
as both readings are acquired through synchrophasor measurement
units at the WTG terminal connection to the grid.
The blade pitch angle, θ measured in degrees, in the second step
of Fig. 1a can control the kinetic energy harvested by the blades. In
MFM, this ability is modelled by the first CFS, CFS1, which has the
objective of maintaining the rotational speed within its operational
limits. This is achieved by actuating the storage of wind at the turbine
blades.
The second CFS in Fig. 1c, CFS2, is used to represent how the
back-to-back converters in the DFIG are responsible for maintaining
appropriate interaction between the WTG and the grid. This is done
through control of the conversion of rotational energy into electric
energy as represented by Con1.
The MFM functional model in Fig. 1c allows a rule based analy-
sis of the cause-effect relations. As an example, consider a scenario
where the wind speed is increasing from normal to high, which
causes a large flow of mass through So1. The cause-effect relations
can be evaluated through Fig. 1d, where the affected functions are
marked in red.
Initially, the wind speed in the MFS is indicated high by the red
source function So1 in Fig. 1d, which subsequently increase the mass
flow from the up wind stream and past the WTG, indicated by the
red transport and storage functions in Fig. 1d. In theory, the mass of
wind will likewise increase in the down stream sink, although the
scale of this increase depends on the aerodynamic efficiency of the
blades and their capability of absorbing the increased mass flow.
Following the increased wind mass passing the blades as a result
of the increased wind speed, the kinetic energy, So2 in the EFS
of Fig. 1d increases as indicated by the red marking. With a higher
kinetic energy, the rotation of the WTG shaft increases, and this
acceleration twists the shaft, resulting in an increase in both elas-
tic and rotational energy as indicated in red in Fig. 1d. As Sto2
gets high, the pitch angle control in CFS1 evaluates the rotational
speed, and if the rotational speed exceeds its limit, the pitch angle
is increased to lower the wind mass stored in Sto1. This control
completes the control loop indicated in red in Fig. 1d.
This example demonstrates how the functional model can be used
to analyse WTG behaviour due to its intuitive representation of
cause-effect relations. In the following, the formulated functional
model is analyzed with the objective of deriving a state estimation
model to demonstrate the application of functional modeling in the
CPS.
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3.1 State estimator for WTG
The SE for removal of gross measurement error is based on the
concept of state estimation, capable of estimating the value of mea-
surements from state variables and state space equations [11]. Before
formulating the state equations linking the state space variables
and the measurements, the latter are identified. From the functional
model in Fig. 1c, ten quantities characterizing the mechanical and
electrical systems are identified, which form the set of measurements
z. In Table 1 each measurement is represented by the corresponding
MFM function in Fig. 1c based on the analysis in Section 3.
The combination of measurements chosen from the MFM model
in Fig. 1c captures the key steps in the energy conversion process
starting from the effects of the free wind speed and finishing at the
delivery of current at the grid terminals. The set of measurements, z,
is shown in (1).
z = [v, θ, ωr, P, Q,Urms, Irms, U, I,∆ωr] (1)
where Urms and Irms are the root mean square (rms) line to ground
voltage in volts and line current in ampere, respectively, U and I
are the instantaneous phase sine wave voltage in volts and current
in ampere, and ∆ωr is a pseudo measurement of the change in
rotational speed in radians per seconds squared between two time
instances, with an assumed time resolution of 1 s.
From the functional relations identified in Fig. 1c, the pseudo
measurement∆ωr can be related through the power balancing func-
tion in the shaft. The acceleration of the rotating shaft is defined
in (2).
∆ωr =
1
2H
(Tmech − Telec) (2)
where H is the WTG’s moment of inertia, and Tmech and Telec are
the mechanical and electric torque, respectively. The right hand side
of (2) is expanded further in (3)-(5) through physical relations.
∆ωr =
1
2H
(
Pmech
ωr
− Pelec
ωr
)
(3)
=
1
2H
(
Pwind (v)Cp (λ, θ)
ωr
− 3UrmsIrmscos (φ)
ωr
)
(4)
=
1
2H
(
Pwind (v)Cp (ωr, v)
ωr
− 3UrmsIrmscos (φ)
ωr
)
(5)
where Pwind (v) is the kinetic energy in the wind , φ is the power
factor, and Cp (λ, θ) is the power coefficient as a function of the tip
speed ratio, λ and blade pitch angle, θ, respectively.
From (4) to (5), the power coefficient dependency is changed by
1) utilizing that λ is defined by the dimensions of the WTG blades,
ωr and v, and 2) assuming the blade pitch angle controller operate
close to the optimal pitch angle. This assumption enables an analysis
of the WTG power coefficient curves with the objective of defining
an expression of θ as a function of ωr and v.
The expression in (5) only use four of the parameters in Fig. 1a to
calculate the shaft acceleration. This observation means that the set
of measurements in (1), can be determined through a set of inde-
pendent variables x and a set of state equations. The latter now
has to be identified to finish the establishment of the state estima-
tion model. These equations are identified through the consideration
Table 1 Set of measurements derived from functional model
z v θ ωr P Q
Functions Sto1 CFS1 Sto2 Con1 Con1
z Urms Irms U I ∆ωr
Functions Si2 Si2 CFS2 CFS2
So2
Con1
of the defined set of independent variables in (6) and the relations
within the WTG represented by the functional model in Fig. 1c.
x = [v, ωr, Urms, Irms] (6)
With the set of variables in (6) of size n = 4, and the set of
measurements in (1) of sizem = 10, the redundancies used for esti-
mating the state variables in the model, are calculated as the degree
of freedom df = m− n = 6. The objective of the SE is to exploit
such an overdetermined non-linear system through an iterative pro-
cess of estimating independent state variables based on equations
and measurements. This way, the knowledge about the physical sys-
tem can help to reduce the inclusion of measurement error in later
analysis. The process of state estimation is built around the nonlin-
ear measurement model in (7), where the set of measurements, z, is
defined as a sum of state equations h (x) and a measurement error
vector e of zero mean and σ2 variance.
z = h (x) + e (7)
Traditionally, state estimation is performed by solving the
weighted least squares (WLS) problem through an iterative process
of minimizing the weighted sum of square residuals, J (x), defined
in (8).
J (x) = 1/2
m∑
j=1
(
r2j
σ2j
)
(8)
where rj is the residual zj − hj (x) and σ2j is the variance of the
j-th measurement. The WLS method has been proven efficient in
multiple works since its introduction in [11, 32]. Therefore, the WLS
is used in this work to minimize the residuals in the proposed state
estimation model.
Designing the SE for DER application argues for implementa-
tion on an embedded system, which entails special requirements
for the estimation algorithm. It must 1) be convergence robust to
avoid an infinite loop of calculations, and 2) have appropriately fast
computational speed to avoid indeterminism. Compliance with the
first requirement is obtained through orthogonal factorization due
to its robustness advantage described in [33]. The latter require-
ment is satisfied through the high abstraction level analysis through
functional modeling, limiting the number of measurements, equa-
tions and variables included in the SE, and choosing an appropriate
stopping criteria of the iterative estimation algorithm. The earlier
work described in [34] analyze the computational speed of the
SE while implemented on an embedded system, showing adequate
performance.
For the SE based on the functional model of a WTG in Fig. 1c,
the set of state equations h (x) are defined through the state variables
chosen in (6), and presented is in (9)-(18).
v = v (9)
θ = f (v, ωr) (10)
ωr = ωr (11)
P = 3UrmsIrmscos (φ) (12)
Q = 3UrmsIrmssin (φ) (13)
Urms = Urms (14)
Irms = Irms (15)
U = Urms
√
2sin (2pift + α) (16)
I = Irms
√
2sin (2pift+ β) (17)
∆ωr =
1
2H
(
Pwind (v)Cp (ωr, v)
ωr
− UrmsIrmscos (φ)
ωr
)
(18)
The function, f (v, ωr), in (10) is defined by the power coefficient
curves supplied in [30], and represented by a four term Gaussian
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numerical expression identified in [34]. Equations (16) and (17)
includes the voltage and current angles, α and β, respectively. These
angles are assumed accurately acquired through the use of syn-
chrophasor measurement units at the WTGs. From this assumption,
the calculation of the power factor of each WTG is done through
(19)
cos (φ) = cos (α− β) (19)
Since the voltage and current angles are assumed accurately
acquired according to international standards [35], these angles and
the power factor are assumed available in the establishment of the
state estimation model. As the WTG in this research is investigated
as part of a WPP, the expressions in (5) and (10) need to consider
the possibility of suboptimal blade pitch angle due to control signals
from the main controller.
The suboptimal position of θ is defined by the WPP main con-
troller active power setpoint PWTGset communicated to each WTG
within its control area [36]. Using the active power set point as
input, the correctional coefficients Kθ and KCp are defined by fine
tuning (10) and (18), respectively. Including the correction coeffi-
cients changes the state equations in (10) and (18) to (20) and (21),
respectively.
θ = f (v, ωr)Kθ (20)
∆ωr =
1
2H

Pwind (v) Cp(ωr ,v)KCp
ωr
− UrmsIrmscos (φ)
ωr


(21)
3.1.1 Bad data detector: In a SE, a valuable tool for removal
of gross measurement error is a bad data detector (BDD). The
BDD objective is removing gross measurement error, defined as
5σ < ej < 20σ in [37], from z. In the WTG SE, the BDD is exe-
cuted after each iteration of the state estimation algorithm, starting
from the detection process based on hypothesis testing of J (x)-test
described in [11].
If bad data is detected, the weighted residuals are sorted in a
descending order and the first measurement b, is assumed to con-
tain gross measurement error, completing the identification process.
Next, b is eliminated through (22) as described in [34].
znewb = z
old
b − sign
(
zoldb − hb (x)
)
· |a| (22)
where hb (x) is the estimated value of the identified bad mea-
surement b from the state variables and equations, a is a normal
distributed random number with zero mean and standard deviation of
σ = 0.01. The elimination process pushes the measurement towards
the estimated value, hb (x), which is assumed as a more accurate
representation of the correct value than the received measurement.
4 WPP test system
Current practice of monitoring operation of individual WTGs
through standard SCADA systems is done by averaging the incom-
ing measurements across 10 minutes of operation [38]. This
approach efficiently removes gross measurement error, but limits the
visibility of the dynamics in the system. The aim of the SE proposed
in the previous section is to improve the monitoring of a single WTG
operation by actively removing gross measurement errors before
broadcasting measurement at normal SCADA resolution of 1 Hz.
The SE is intended for implementation on an embedded sys-
tem, and located between the acquisition and communication of data
between the individual WTG and aWPP control center. The purpose
of the test scenario investigated in this paper is to indicate how the
implementation of the SE at the individual WTGs in a small WPP
improve monitoring through higher time resolution data acquisition
as well as limiting the impact of cyber vulnerability exploitation
through active removal of gross measurement error.
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Fig. 2: Wind power plant cyber and physical system, represented by
the communication channels and a single line diagram, respectively.
The removal of gross measurement error becomes important
when utilizing the measurements of individual WTGs in perform-
ing WPP controls. In the recent decades, DER have been required
to actively participate in grid operation through active and reactive
power controls [36]. One of these control strategies commands the
WPP to limit its active power output to a portion of its rated capacity
thereby deloading the operation of the WTGs [39].
Such a control command can be handled in different ways. One
option is stopping the current injection of WTGs one by one until
the active power limit is satisfied, however, due to the fluctuations
of the wind, this crude method is not desirable. Instead, each WTG
is controlled to lower their power production to a value decided by
the WPP controller dispatch function. The dispatch function of the
controller is supported by a feedback loop that evaluates whether the
WPP satisfies its setpoint PWPPset [36].
The active power set point, PWTGset , can be equal for all WTGs.
However, PWTGset usually varies according to the available power of
each individual WTG. Calculating the available power of eachWTG,
PWTGavail can be done through different techniques, as described
in [40]. Most of the methods rely on observations from the physical
system to estimate the available power for each WTG, making them
vulnerable to gross measurement error and data integrity attacks. In
this research, the adjusted power curve distribution function is used,
where the power is estimated through the power curve of the WTG
and the free wind speed in front of the WTG [40]. The individual
WTG power set point is then calculated by a percentage of the avail-
able power, making it capable of delivering the WPP power set point
during wind fluctuations.
The SE based on the functional model in Fig. 1c, is evaluated
through implementation in a numerical WPP simulation model,
defined by the single line diagram in the Physical system part
of Figure 2.
The WPP, composed by 6 DFIG WTGs each with a rated power
of 1.5 MW, is assumed located perpendicular to the wind direction
to neglect wake effects. Each WTG is experiencing a wind speed
with equal average value with different local fluctuations to represent
turbulence. These assumptions are included to emphasise the effects
of gross measurement error and are not limiting the independence
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of the SE in practice. The WTGs are modeled using the parameters
given in [30].
The WPP collector system is modeled by assuming an onshore
radial topology with the grid equipment parameters shown
in Table 2 [30, 41, 42] and a system frequency of 60 Hz.
The cyber system of the WPP illustrated in Figure 2 includes the
wind turbine control panels (WTCP), from where measurements and
control signals are communicated. The WTCP is located at the bot-
tom of the WTG tower, and can be used by maintenance crews to
acquire data and control the WTG [15]. To emulate measurement
noise in the simulation of the WPP, a normal distributed random
noise with zero mean and standard deviation of σ = 0.01 is added
to each measurement before it is acquired.
In this research, the application of the DER SE is investigated
in a scenario where the embedded system is connected directly to
the WTCP as shown in Figure 2 and evaluated in a distributed con-
trol application through test cases with large disturbances on the free
wind speed signal. The disturbances are assumed added to the free
wind speed signal at the WTCP of one of the WTGs. The WPP
controller will be evaluated based on its reaction when raw mea-
surements are received directly through the SCADA system, and
when measurements have been through the embedded SE before
being broadcast. Four different disturbances are investigated based
on current literature in false data injection attacks and their impact on
power system controls described in [14], where different attack tem-
plates from [43] are used to evaluate the effect of false data injection
on automatic generation control. The four disturbances considered
in our work are similarly based on attack templates from [43] as
follows.
1. Gross measurement error
2. Random data injection attack
3. Pulse data injection attack
4. Ramping data injection attack
For each of the test scenarios, the average wind speed will be
10 m/s for all WTGs and the WPP controller is commanded by the
transmission system operator to curtail 60% of its active power gen-
eration. Such a scenario emulates a situation where the power system
has over-production and requires down-regulation.
The test cases simulate situations where the cyber system of one
WTG experience errors or attacks by adversaries with the objective
to disturb the operation of the WTG. In test case 2, the adversaries
acquire the free wind speed, adds a normal distributed random num-
ber of zero mean and standard deviation of σ = 0.1. In the third test
case, the adversaries add an impulse of, apulse = −0.1pu on the
free wind speed every 5 second. The last data injection attack sim-
ulates a scenario where the adversaries distort the free wind speed
signal through ramping with a slope equal to aramp = −0.001pu
[14].
Table 2 Collector system parameters
Equipment Abbreviation Parameter Value
Substation cable SC Length 20 km
Resistance 77.8 mΩ/km
Inductance 10 µH/km
Capacitance 0.14 µF/km
Wind power plant WPPS Primary voltage 230 kV
substation transformer Secondary voltage 34.5 kV
Rated power 10 MVA
Collector cable CC1-6 Length 10 km
Resistance 268 mΩ/km
Inductance 482 µH/km
Capacitance 0.16 µF/km
Generator step-up GSU1-6 Primary voltage 34.5 kV
transformer Secondary voltage 0.6 kV
Rated power 2 MVA
5 Results
In this section, the results of the four test cases are presented and ana-
lyzed with the purpose of evaluating the utilization of the SE derived
from the functional model in Fig. 1c.
5.1 Test 1: Gross measurement error
In the first test case, a single occasion of gross measurement error,
equal to ε = −0.1σ, on the free wind speed signal for WTG1 is sim-
ulated and investigated in a situation where the WTG state estimator
is deactivated. The reason for deactivating the SE is to illustrate how
harmful gross measurement error can be to the plant controller.
The plots in Figure 3 represent the results of simulating the sys-
tem during steady state operation while being subject to an injection
of gross measurement error. For each plot, the signals from all six
WTGs in the WPP are included, and as WTG1 is the one being sub-
ject to gross measurement error, its response is highlighted by the
dashed line.
The occurrence of gross measurement error is clearly visible
in Fig. 3a, where the free wind speed signal of WTG1 is around
1 m/s lower than the other WTGs. In both Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b, the
value of the signal changes once every second due to the assumption
of 1 Hz SCADA data acquisition frequency.
In Fig. 3b, the active power set point decided by the WPP con-
troller is shown for each WTG, where wind turbine 1 has a con-
siderably lower set point than the rest of the turbines. This happens
as the WPP calculates the expected available power for each WTG
using the power curve characteristics as explained in Section 4, the
results of which are presented in Table 3. Here the available power
calculated for WTG1 is around 0.25 pu less than for the other wind
turbines due to the lower free wind speed observed by the WPP
controller.
In Table 3, a comparison is made between two scenarios, where
the SE of WTG1 is deactivated and activated. From the PWTGavail ,
the available active power for all wind turbines, except the first, in
both scenarios are equal, clearly indicating that the only difference
between the two scenarios is the status of the SE. From the v signal
received by the controller, it is apparent that when the SE is active,
the free wind speed is closer to the average speed of 10 m/s. The
difference is due to the SE having removed a part of the gross mea-
surement error and estimated the signal value with higher accuracy
than using the raw measurement directly.
Table 3 indicates the capability of limiting measurement error
through utilizing the functional modeling based SE presented
in Section 3. The motivation behind removing the error is clearly
visible when observing the blade pitch angle and rotational speed
signals taken directly from the simulation model and presented
in Fig. 3c and Fig. 3d, respectively. In both figures, the dotted line
is the results of WTG1 from simulating the system with the SE
activated.
The results in Fig. 3c show how the change in active power set
point, forces the blade pitch angle of WTG1 to increase rapidly.
Table 3 Comparison of plant controller signals with and without state estima-
tor
SE1 v PWTGavail P
%WPP
avail P
WTG
set
D
e
a
c
ti
v
a
te
d
WTG1 8.72 0.512 11.9% 0.313
WTG2 10.20 0.781 18.2% 0.477
WTG3 10.00 0.752 17.5% 0.460
WTG4 9.98 0.748 17.4% 0.457
WTG5 10.00 0.754 17.5% 0.461
WTG6 10.00 0.755 17.6% 0.462
A
c
ti
v
a
te
d
WTG1 9.68 0.693 15.5% 0.407
WTG2 10.16 0.781 17.4% 0.458
WTG3 10.00 0.752 16.8% 0.441
WTG4 9.98 0.748 16.7% 0.439
WTG5 10.01 0.754 16.8% 0.442
WTG6 10.02 0.755 16.8% 0.443
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Fig. 3: Simulation results for the first test case, where a single occurrence of gross measurement error on the free wind speed signal is observed.
This is mainly due to the mismatch between the wind speed mea-
surement received by the WPP controller and the actual wind speed
experienced by WTG1. This mismatch is a result of the added gross
measurement error and assumed noise in the communication chan-
nel. The distribution function in the WPP controller believes the
first wind turbine is experiencing lower wind speeds than the other
WTGs and as a result asks WTG1 to decrease its active power gener-
ation seen in Fig. 3b. As WTG1 experience higher wind speeds than
believed by the WPP controller, it has to rapidly increase the blade
pitch angle, shown in Fig. 3c, to meet the active power set point set
by theWPP controller. As the pitch angle increases from 8.8◦to 9.5◦,
the aerodynamic efficiency of the blades decreases which slow down
the rotational speed of the shaft, as shown in Fig. 3d. In comparison,
with the SE activated the changes in blade pitch angle and rotational
speed of WTG1 are similar to those observed for the remaining five
wind turbines. This is because the SE improves the accuracy of the
physical system observability by reducing the mismatch between the
wind speed perceived by the plant controller and experienced by
WTG1.
From a mechanical and maintenance perspective, the gross mea-
surement errors cause additional stress on the rotating parts. In this
test case, only a single instance of gross measurement error is inves-
tigated. In the two following tests, the mechanical system is stressed
further through injection of higher than normal measurement error
and pulse injection of gross measurement error, respectively.
5.2 Test 2 and 3: Random and pulse data injection attack
The analysis of the test cases with the injection of large measurement
error through random and pulse data injection, starts by observing
how the free wind speed signal received by the plant controller prop-
agates with the SE deactivated and activated. The wind speed signals
of the two test cases are shown in Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b.
From the free wind speed signal in Fig. 4a, the measurement error
is rather large compared to the average wind speed of 10 m/s, if the
raw measurement is used for calculating the available active power
in the WPP controller, it will affect the active power set point of
WTG1, as observed in the previous test case.
The large deviations in active power set point affects how the
rotational speed of WTG changes. In Fig. 4c the rotational accelera-
tion between each second of operation is calculated through the time
derivative and shown for the two scenarios of SE status. The results
clearly show how the large measurement error cause more violent
changes in rotational speed, which ultimately affects the lifetime of
the rotating shaft. This kind of cyber-attack objective has previously
been used in the famous Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear pro-
gram where centrifuges were controlled to run faster than rated speed
causing their lifetime to decrease.
For the third test case, the free wind speed signal is subject to a
0.2 Hz pulsating measurement error as seen in Fig. 4b. The pulsat-
ing injection of bad data included in the WPP calculations of the
active power set point of WTG1, and can be observed affecting the
acceleration of the rotating shaft in Fig. 4d. For both these test cases,
utilizing the SE can limit the higher mechanical stress entailed by
data integrity attacks.
Lowering the lifetime and increasing maintenance cost is one way
of attacking WTGs, another more direct approach would be to try
and stall the turbine by ramping down the free wind speed signal
until the rotational speed decreases beyond its tripping limit.
5.3 Test 4: Ramping data injection attack
This test case is used to demonstrate whether the SE is able to
prevent WTG1 from tripping during a ramping attack. First of all,
the severity of ramping attacks is evaluated by observing the free
wind speed measurement for all wind turbines in the WPP as shown
in Fig. 5a.
Comparing the measurements of the different WTGs in Fig. 5a,
a clear difference is visible between the wind speed of WTG1 and
the remaining five WTGs. This is due to the data integrity attack that
tries to mimic a situation where the wind speed is slowly decreasing.
The consequence of the decreasing wind speed is visible in Fig. 5b,
where the blade pitch angle of WTG1, highlighted by the dashed
blue line, is slowly increasing compared to the other wind turbines.
The pitch angle increases due to the mismatch between observed free
wind speed from the WTG and the WPP controller perspectives. As
the central plant controller receives information of lower than actual
free wind speed, it calculates a lower than actual PWTG1avail . And as
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(c) Shaft acceleration signal of wind turbine 1 in the second test case
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(d) Shaft acceleration signal of wind turbine 1 in the third test case
Fig. 4: Simulation results for the second and third test cases, where a random and pulse injections of gross measurement error on the free wind
speed signal are observed.
the WPP controller uses a dispatch function for deloading operation,
PWTG1set is lower than necessary.
Therefore, the local controls of WTG1 needs to increase the pitch
blade angle considerably more than the other wind turbines in the
WPP. Around the 400th second of simulation time, the pitch angle
starts decreasing drastically. The reason can be observed in Fig. 5c,
where the rotational speed of WTG1, highlighted by the dashed line,
slowly decreases proportionally to the free wind speed signal. After
approximately 400 seconds, the rotational speed exceeds the lower
tripping limit, assumed equal to 0.7 pu. From the results in Fig. 5c, a
visible difference is also observed in the rotational speed of the nor-
mal operating wind turbines around the 300th second of simulation.
As the power production of WTG1 decreases, the other WTGs needs
to compensate for the missing active power causing them to increase
their rotational speed.
The effects of the ramping attack means one of the WTGs
shut down, increasing the share of generation responsibility for the
remaining generators. This affects the plant owner as fluctuations
in the wind can cause dips in production and thereby decrease the
economic benefits of the WPP.
The system is simulated once again, now with the SE activated.
In Fig. 5b and Fig. 5c, the blade pitch angle and rotational speed, of
WTG1 in this scenario, is illustrated by the dotted line. Clearly, the
SE improves the operational situation of theWPP as it helps avoiding
a tripping of WTG1. In Fig. 5b, the blade pitch angle of WTG1, in
this scenario, is observed slightly higher than the other WTGs, con-
sequently, the rotational speed is slightly lower for WTG1 in Fig. 5c.
The reason for these differences is the limited accuracy of the state
estimation model based on the functional modeling approach. If
substituted by a SE based on physical modeling, it could be more
accurate, however, it would entail a higher computational require-
ment as well as necessary detailed parametrization for different
models.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes functional modeling for power system analysis
as it transits towards a cyber-physical system, specifically mon-
itoring of distributed energy resources through state estimation.
The benefits from using functional modeling compared to other
approaches are discussed in terms of generality.
Through the state estimator formulated from the functional mod-
eling analysis, this paper demonstrates the value of considering
monitoring distributed energy resources due to the distribution of
control and necessity of considering cyber vulnerabilities.
Through testing the state estimator in different data integrity
attack scenarios, it can be evaluated capable of limiting the effects of
attacks on the lifetime and maintenance of the mechanical assets in
a wind turbine. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated how the state
estimator prevents wind turbine tripping while subject to a ramping
attack.
While the benefits from using the state estimator are clear, the pro-
posed system can be improved further with regards to the estimation
method. Other potential directions of future research include test-
ing the system with real wind turbine data and using the functional
modeling approach on different technologies and applications.
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